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COMMENT
CREDITOR DEFENSES UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT:
THE DIMINISHING RADIUS OF 15 U.S.C. 1640(c).
Passage of the Truth in Lending Act (Act) in 1968' culminated
several years of congressional study and debate as to the propriety
and usefulness of imposing mandatory disclosure requirements on
those who extend credit to consumers in the American market. 2
 In
order to effectuate the Act's broad disclosure policy, Congress pro-
vided that any credit consumer could maintain a civil action against a
creditor who violated the Act.' Although such provision encouraged
civil enforcement of the Act, the Act also provided creditors with two
defenses to civil actions. 4
 While both defenses will be discussed, this
comment will primarily focus on 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (hereinafter
1640(c)), 5
 because creditors have most heavily invoked this provision
to defend a broad spectrum of disclosure violations." However, since
its passage, courts consistently have construed section 1640(c) nar-
rowly by ruling that the section only excuses violations caused by er-
rors of a clerical nature.' Moreover, two recent circuit court decisions
have further diminished 1640(c)'s scope by ruling that the section's
maintenance provision requires creditors to institute rechecking sys-
tems which are reasonably adapted to detect disclosure violations."
This comment will consider the propriety of these narrow con-
strictions of 1640(c) in light of the Act's overall scheme and pervasive
philosophy. To this end, the conditions which spawned the passage of
the Act will be discussed and 1640(c) will be placed in the context of
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65 (Supp. IV 1969).
2
 Mourning v. Family Publications Scrv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, any creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to dis-
close to any person any information required under this part to be disclosed to that
person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of (1) twice the amount of
the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that the liability tinder this
paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and (2) in the case of
any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action together
with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
4 Id. at 1640(b) & (c).
• 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under this section
fur a violation of this subchapter if the creditor shows by a preponderance
of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.
° Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1162 (7th Cir. 1974)
(disclosure omissions in retail installment sales contract); Buford v. American Fin. Co.,
333 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (creditor failed to include notary fee in com-
putation of finance charge); Ratner v. Chemical Bank Trust Cu., 329 F. Supp. 270,
281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (creditor failed to disclose nominal annual percentage rate).
▪See, e.g., Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (7th
Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chemical Bank Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
" Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296, 1297 (5th Cir. 1976);
Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the Act's evolution. The comment will then examine the requirements
of section 1640(c), paying particular attention to that section's intent
element and maintenance proviso. After analyzing several cases rais-
ing the section 1640(c) defense, this comment will suggest that 1640(c)
excuses only errors made in disclosing the annual percentage rate and
that 1640(c)'s maintenance provision requires creditors to institute and
adhere to rechecking systems which are reasonably adapted to detect
annual percentage rate errors. It will be concluded that. this narrow
and specific judicial construction of the section 1640(c) defense is war-
ranted, because such construction comports with the broadly remedial
and pro-consumer orientation of the Truth in Lending Act.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
In the period following World War II and ending with the 1968
passage of the Truth in Lending Act, the amount. of consumer
credit in this country increased in astronomical proportions."
Against this soaring demand for credit weighed the charge that in
many instances consumers did not know the actual price they paid For
the credit they used.'" Because of the divergent, and at times fraudu-
lent, practices by which consumers were informed of the cost of the
credit extended to them, many consumers were prevented from
shopping For the best credit terms available." Indeed, consumers
were usually faced with a plethora of bewildering rates, charges, and
terms when seeking to borrow money or to buy consumer goods on
an installment basis.' 2
Consumer confusion existed despite three different types of
state credit legislation enacted at various intervals during the twen-
tieth century." By the end of the first decade of this century most.
states had enacted usury laws, which set limits on the amount of in-
terest charged for the use of money.' 4
 However, unlike the Truth in
Lending Act, usury laws do not require creditors to disclose the ap-
plicable rate of interest in a uniform manner nor do they apply to
•° Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973). In this
period outstanding consumer credit had increased from 5.6 billion to 95.9 billion, a rate
of growth four and one-hall times as great as that of the economy. Id.
REV. No. 1040, 90th Cong,, 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in H9681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Au. NEWS 1962, 1965.
" Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
' 2 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong„ 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 119681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. News 1962, 1970. The report contains several examples of the diverse lan-
guage which the credit industry employed to describe the cost of credit prior to the Act.
It was found that creditors used "add on" rates to disclose the finance charge as a per-
centage, imposed supplementary charges such as credit investigation fees and "service
charges," and often made no disclosure of a percentage rate at all. Id. In addition, a
survey published in 1964 asked 800 families to estimate the rate of the finance charge
they were paying on their consumer debts. The average estimate was approximately 8
percent, although the actual average rate paid was almost 24 percent. Id.
"See Note, 22 CASE W. L. M.N. 89, 94-97 (1970).
"hi. at 94.
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credit sales of goods because of the time-price doctrine." In addition
to usury laws, many states began in the 1920's to initiate small loan
legislation which set an interest ceiling of three and one half percent
per month on the unpaid balance, approximately 42 percent
annually." This legislation is narrow in scope in that it is inapplicable
to loans over $5,000; it does not require uniform disclosure of rates
and charges; and it is inapplicable to credit sales.' 7
 With the recogni-
tion that usury laws and small loan legislation were of no help to the
consumer who purchased goods on credit, most states, beginning in
1950, passed retail installment sales acts." These acts provide only li-
mited help to the consumer because most state retail installment acts
are only applicable to certain goods and they do not require creditors
to disclose credit terms to the consumer in a uniform manner.' 9
Although state usury laws, small loan legislation, and retail in-
stallment acts establish interest ceilings, they do not require creditors
to provide consumers with a simple statement regarding the actual
cost of the credit applicable to the consumer transaction." In passing
the Truth in Lending Act, Congress positively responded to the con-
tention that consumers were entitled to know the cost of credit so that
they could plan prudently and shop wisely." To this end, Congress
expressly declared that the purpose of the Act was to assure a mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms so as to enable the consumer to com-
pare more readily the various credit terms available to him and to
avoid the uninformed use of credit. 22
The Act does not seek to regulate credit itself. Rather, it re-
quires a creditor to disclose fully the terms of credit prior to con-
summating any consumer transaction. 23 Specifically, the Act's aim is to
provide the consumer with two essential facts which are critical to any
decision involving the use of credit.24
 The Act requires creditors to
" Id. at 94-95. The time-price doctrine refers to the fact that merchants who sell
goods on credit are not lenders. Because the cash paid over a period of time is not
worth as much to a merchant as the same amount paid at the time of the purchase, the
merchant must increase the price of the goods to make up for the loss. The credit
charge merely represents the difference between the time price and cash price, thus
distinguished from interest, which is a charge for the use of money. Id. at 95.
' 6 /d. In 1916 the Russel Sage Foundation drafted the Uniform Small Loan Act.
HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOANS LAWS, 181-85 (1958). This Act became the
model for the small loan legislation now in effect in 49 of the 50 states. Note, 22 CASE
W. L. REV. 89, 95 (1970).
12 Note, 22 CASE W. L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1970).
' 6 /d. at 96.
' 9 /d. at 97. In fact, certain states' retail credit legislation only applies to the credit
sales of automobiles. Id.
25 Id.
21
 H.R. Rer. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1965.
23
 15 U.S.C.	 1601 (1970).
23 TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: HEARINGS  ON S. 5 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY. S. Doc, No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967) (statement of Senator William Proxmire).
22 Id. at 2.
714
DIMINISHING RADIUS OF 15 U.S.C. 1640(c)
disclose the finance charge applicable to the transaction, 25
 which com-
prises the sum of all direct and indirect charges imposed by the cred-
itor incident to the extension of credit. 26
 In addition, the Act re-
quires the disclosure of an annual percentage rate," or the rate which
will yield an amount equal to the finance charge when applied to the
unpaid balance of the amount financed. 25 It was thought that by pro-
viding the consumer with such information prior to the credit transac-
tion, the consumer could more easily identify and compare credit
terms and thus could make better use of his credit dollar."
Since the Act is remedial in nature, enforcement is of primary
importance. 3° Congress created a tripartite enforcement scheme to
ensure that creditors comply with the Act. The Act generally provides
2° 15 U.S.C. § I638(a) (1970),
22
 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1970), provides the following definition of finance charge:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of the finance
charge in connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be deter-
mined as the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the per-
son to whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by
the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit, including any of the
following types of charges which are applicable:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a
point, discount, or other system or additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3)Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting
the creditor against the obligor's default or other credit loss.
See also Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (1975).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1970).
12
 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (1970), divides the determination of the annual percentage
rate into two categories. 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (I) (1970), deals with the case of an exten-
sion of credit other than under an open end credit plan. The section allows creditors to
determine the annual percentage rate by any method prescribed by the Federal Reserve
Board or by following the formula prescribed in 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1)(A) (1970),
which provides:
The annual percentage rate applicable to any extension of consumer credit
shall be determined, in accordance with the regulations of the Board ...
as that nominal annual percentage rate which will yield a sum equal to the
amount of the finance charge when it is applied to the unpaid balances of
the amount financed, calculated according to the actuarial method of al-
locating payments made on a debt between the amount financed and the
amount of the finance charge, pursuant to which a payment is applied
first to the accumulated finance charge and the balance is applied to the
unpaid amount financed.
15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(2) (1970), describes the manner in which the annual percentage
rate is determined in the case of an extension of credit under an open end credit plan.
The provision provides that the annual percentage rate shall be determined as the quo-
tient of the total finance charge for the period to which it relates divided by the amount
upon which the finance charge for that period is based, multipled by the number of
such periods in a year. Id. See also Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(a) &
226.5(b) (1976).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
30 See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
713
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
for monitoring of the credit industry by administrative agencies, 3 ' au-
thorizes criminal proceedings in certain circumstances," and allows an
aggrieved consumer to maintain a civil action against any person who
violates the Act."
With respect to administrative monitoring of the credit industry,
the Federal Reserve Board is entrusted with policing member banks
of the Federal Reserve System." In addition, seven other federal
agencies are empowered to regulate creditors within their respective
jurisdictions. 35 The second stratum of the Act's governmental en-
forcement scheme authorizes the initiation of criminal proceedings
against any creditor who willfully and knowingly violates the Act. 36
The sanction for such a violation is a $5,000 fine or a year in prison
or both." However, the criminal tier of the Act's enforcement device
exists mostly as a threat, since there apparently has never been a con-
viction under this section. 38
Since governmental enforcement of the Act is primarily regula-
tory, the Act's private enforcement mechanism warrants special
analysis. Concomitant with the powers vested in these governmental
agencies, the Act provides the aggrieved consumer with the private
remedies of rescission3" and civil liability. 4" Since the rescission remedy
is limited in scope in that it only applies when a creditor retains or ac-
quires a security interest in a consumer's real property,' civil liability
has become the more effective enforcement mechanism. Under the
Act, a creditor who fails to make a required disclosure is subject to
liability for twice the finance charge up to $1,000, but not less than
$100, plus reasonable attorneys' fees. 42 Moreover, the Act waives the
federal jurisdictional minimum by allowing an aggrieved consumer to
bring an action in federal district court regardless of the amount in
controversy. 43
 Thus, the civil liability section plays a prominent role in
3 ' 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970).
" Id. at § 1611.
33 1d. at § 1640 (Supp. V 1975).
34 Id. at § 1607(a)(1)(B) (1970). In addition to this enforcement responsibility, the
Federal Reserve Board is authorized to promulgate regulations to carry out the pur-
poses of the Act. Id. at § 1604. It has done so in a set of comprehensive regulations
which are collectively known as Regulation Z. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1976).
as 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970). These agencies include the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, Civil Aeronautics Board. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and Department of Agriculture. Id.
H Id. at § 160.7(c).
37 Id. at § 1611,
33
 The author's research has failed to discover any published cases involving a
prosecution pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
33
 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970).
45 1d. at § 1640 (Supp. V 1975).
" Id. at § 1635 (1970).
41 /d. at § 1640(a) (Supp. V 1975).
43 Id. at § 1640(e) (1970).
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the Act's overall scheme by compensating those who choose to partici-
pate in the Act's enforcement.
The Act has no provision specifying the manner in which the
public and private enforcement sections interrelate. It is obvious,
though, that not every violation of the Act will be discovered by the
administrative agency responsible for policing the industry in which
the violation occurred. While. the House believed that administrative
enforcement of the Act would be preeminent. because consumers
lacked both the knowledge and the means of initiating civil suits,"
nevertheless civil enforcement has been consistently encouraged." In-
deed, the civil liability section of the Act has been credited with crea-
ting a new species of private attorneys general to participate in the
enforcement of the Act."
Under the Act., a creditor does not, escape responsibility for its
violation simply because it was not detected by the governing adminis-
trative agency. To the contrary, the creditor must always be aware of
the possibility that a consumer will bring a civil action predicated
upon the violation. Since the Act. contains no requirement. that a con-
sumer prove that he was actually deceived by the disclosure error,'"
all credit consumers can potentially prosecute erring creditors. Be-
cause the Act creates a new species of private attorneys general, cred-
itors testifying at the congressional hearings on the Act voiced particu-
lar concern with possible defenses."
The two branches of Congress were not in total agreement on
the proper role of defenses under the Act's civil liability section. Many
of the creditors who testified at the Senate hearings were disturbed
that the original Senate bill contained no defenses to civil actions
brought by consumers." Much of the creditors' discontent. was fo-
cused at disclosure of the annual percentage rate." At an early point
" H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 11968) U.S. Con:
CO No. & Al). N EWS 1962, 1965.
45
 Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
"Id.
"Id.
"E.g., TRUTH IN LENDING: HEARINGS ON S.5 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS OE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY. S. DOC. NO. 302, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1967).
"Id. at 381 (statement of Ralph %atm). Mr. Zaun testified that in an irregular
payment contract in which repayment is tailored to the income of the borrower, conver-
sion tables are of little assistance. For instance, if a teacher who has income for only
nine months of the year wishes to repay his loan in nine monthly installments annually,
instead of twelve, then the annual percentage rate could not be computed according to
the tables proposed by the Department of Treasury. Id. See also id. at 404 (1967) (state-
ments of J.O. Elmer & William Kirchner).
"Id. at 698 (statement of the National Automobile Dealers Association). It was
stated that creditors' costs of doing business will increase due to the difficulty of train-
ing employees in the computation of the annual percentage rate, particularly in the case
of irregular payment contracts. Moreover, the dealers asserted that it would be a
unique salesman indeed who could use the conversion tables to compute correctly the
annual percentage rate. Id.
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during the Senate subcommittee hearings on the bill, the Undersec-
retary of the Department of Treasury presented tables for creditors to
use in computing the annual percentage rate." The Undersecretary
testified that disclosure of an annual percentage rate is a simple pro-
cess if creditors consistently employ the tables. 52
 However, several
representatives of the credit industry disagreed with the
Undersecretary's testimony by contending that the tables are of no as-
sistance in computing the annual percentage rate applicable to an ir-
regular payment contract." Moreover, they argued that it was un-
likely that creditors' clerical employees or salespeople would become
proficient at using the tables and that it would seem particularly dif-
ficult for them to learn to compute independently the annual percen-
tage rate applicable to an irregular payment contract." Thus, cred-
itors expressed the fear that under the Senate's bill creditors would
be exposed to civil liability due to a computational error committed by
one of its salespeople or clerical employees. 55
Although the Senate bill originally imposed strict liability for dis-
closure errors, the original House bill required proof of a knowing
violation to establish civil liability. 59
 The original bill provided that if a
creditor erroneously disclosed the annual percentage rate, a presump-
tion would arise that such violation was made knowingly." The pre-
sumption may be rebutted if a creditor shows by a preponderance of
evidence that the violation was not intentional and that it resulted
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of proce-
dures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." However, the re-
quirement of a knowing violation was deleted from the House bill's
final version in response to objections by the Justice Department that
a knowledge requirement might frustrate prospective plaintiffs, and
thereby weaken civil enforcement of the Act. 59
The final version of the original Act resolved this conflict by
providing creditors with two defenses to civil actions. First, section
1640(h) provides that a creditor is not subject to civil liability if within
fifteen days of discovering a disclosure error, and prior to the institu-
tion of an action under the Act or the receipt of a written notice of
the error, the creditor notifies the consumer of the error and makes
whatever adjustments are necessary to insure that the consumer will
not have to pay a finance charge in excess of the amount or percen-
" Id. at 64-67 (statement of Joseph Barr).
52 Id. at 67.
" Id. at 381 (statement of Ralph Zaun). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
54 Id. at 698 (statement of the National Automobile Dealers Association).
" Id. The automobile dealers association called the Act's civil liability section "the
sword of Damocles." Id.
Is°
 CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT: HEARINGS ON H.R. 11601 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COSINI. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, H.R.
Doc. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, 24 (1967).
"Id.
55 Id.
" Id. at 902-03.
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tage rate actually disclosed." In addition, Congress provided creditors
with a defense to civil actions predicated upon violations generated by
certain types of errors. Section 1640(c) provides:
A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought
under this section for a violation of this subchapter if' the
creditor shows by a preponderance of evidence that the vio-
lation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
Assuming that the complaints made by representatives of the credit
industry have a basis in commercial reality, 1640(c) should be a
creditor's most potent weapon to fend off civil liability. Unlike
I640(b), 1640(c) does not require a creditor to take swift action to
correct the disclosure error, thus it is not as restrictive as 1640(b). 6 '
'" 15 U.S.C. 1640(6) (1970) provides:
A creditor has no liability under this section for any failure to comply with
any requirement imposed under this part. if within fifteen days after dis-
covering an error, and prior to the institution of an action under this sec-
tion or the receipt of written notice of the error, the creditor notifies the
person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments in the ap-
propriate account are necessary to insure that the person will not be re-
quired to pay a finance charge in excess of the amount or percentage rate
actually disclosed.
Id. at § 1640. Congress passed an amendment to the Act in 1974 which gave
creditors another defense to civil actions, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(1) (Supp. V 1975), provided:
No provision of this section or section 1611 of this title imposing any liabil-
ity shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with
any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Board, notwithstand-
ing that after such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, or
interpretation is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other
authority to be invalid for any reason.
However, the section was again amended in 1976 and it now provides:
No provision of this section or section 1611 of this title imposing any liabil-
ity shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with
any rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Board or in conformity
with any interpretation or approval by an official or employee of the Federal Re-
serve System duly authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations or approvals
under such procedures as the Board may prescribe therefor, notwithstanding that
after such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, interpreta-
tion, or approval is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or
other authority to be invalid for any reason.
Act of Feb 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197. The 1974 amendment dramati-
cally increased the authority of the Federal Reserve Board. It involved the Board in the
Act's civil enforcement mechanism by allowing creditors to raise reliance upon Board
opinions as a defense to civil action. Prior to the amendment, the spheres of enforce-
ment were distinct and the majority of courts gave little effect to the fact that a particu-
lar violation was partially attributable to the erroneous advice of the Board. E.g., Ives v.
W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757-58 (2d Cir. 1975); Scott v, Liberty Finance Co., 380
F. Supp. 475, 479 (D. Neb. 1974); Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121,
1123 (S.D. III. 1974). However, in assessing this result, Congress concluded that a cred-
itor should not be forced to choose between the Board's construction of the Act and
its own assessment of the way in which a court may interpret the Act. Accordingly, it
proposed the above amendment as a solution. Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749,
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II. THE ELEMENT OF INTENT
Many of the courts which have construed 1640(c) have given ex-
tensive consideration to the type of errors to which the section ap-
plies. Based upon a literal reading of the statute, virtually all courts
have ruled that the error in question must be unintentional. 62
 Despite
this relatively uniform conclusion, 1640(c)'s intent element has been
the subject of two different modes of analysis.
The construction of intent which has been followed by a major-
ity of courts was first advanced by the Southern District of New York
in Rattler v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co." The court in Ratner
ruled that the defendant-bank had violated the Act when it failed to
disclose the annual percentage rate or nominal annual percentage rate
on the consumer's monthly statement pursuant to a Master Charge
Card Agreement." After determining that the bank had violated the
Act, the court then considered whether the error was among the type
excused by 1640(0. 05 The court asserted that 1640(c) establishes a
standard which requires both that the error in question be uninten-
tional and that it occur notwithstanding the maintenance of proce-
dures reasonably adapted to avoid it."" The court found that in omit-
ting the disclosure from its monthly statement, the bank had not sim-
ply overlooked an incomplete statement, but rather, had mistaken the
Act's requirements. Thus, the error in question occurred
intentionally. 67
 To buttress its conclusion, the court asserted that in
light of the Act's legislative history, 1640(c) was meant to absolve only
clerical errors. The defense is wholly inapposite to errors of law such
as that in the instant case."
Whereas the Ratner court essentially ruled that the intentional
aspects of 1640(c) go to the acts and omissions of a creditor, the
758 (2d Cir. 1975), citing SENATE COMM irrEE oN BANKINC, H OUS I NG AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AMENDMENTS [S. 2101], S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess.
13. This amendment proved to be a panacea because a creditor could insulate itself
from civil liability by simply soliciting and following the advice of the Board. The civil
remedy would have been emasculated if Congress had not again amended the section.
Thus, Congress restricted the scope of the defense by adding the requirement that the
interpretation relied upon must have been issued by an agent of the Board duly au-
thorized to promulgate such opinions. Act of Feb. 27, '1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90
Stat. 197, See also Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 416 F. Supp. 514, 518
(D.D.C. 1976).
82 E.g., Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir.
1976); Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757 (2d Cir. 1975); Haynes v. Logan Fur-
niture Mart Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1974); Buford v. American Fin. Co.,
333 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Ratner v. Chemical Bank Trust Co., 329 F.
Supp. 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
83 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61 Id. at 278.
85 /d. at 281.
16 Id.
"T /d. In concluding that a mistake of law does not make a creditor's actions any
less intentional, the court analogized to the criminal law. Id.
68 1d. at 280-81.
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Northern District of Georgia proposed a contrary construction of in-
tent in Welmaker v. W. T. Grant Co. 6" Although the Welmaker court
found that a coupon credit system widely used by defendant violated
the Act by omitting seven different required disclosures, the court
ruled that the violations fell squarely within the defense provided by
1640(c). 7" The court was persuaded that defendant did not intend to
violate the Act, and that the violations resulted from bona fide errors
notwithstanding the fact that defendant maintained procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.'t In reaching this decision,
the court took issue with Ratner's construction of intent." The court
criticized Ratner's reference 16 1640(c)'s legislative history, finding that
recourse to the legislative history was unnecessary in light of 1640(c)'s
plain language." Specifically, the court stated that intent, as used in
1640(c), does not refer to an intent to do an act but rather to an in-
tent to break the law." Thus, according to-the Welmaker court, when a
creditor invokes 1640(c), the issue simply is whether the defendant in-
tended to violate the Act. The We!maker court distinguished Ratner as
being an overly narrow construction of 1640(c). 75
Applying this broader construction of 1640(c) to the instant
facts, the court ruled that W. T. Grant Co. did not intend to violate
the Act. 76
 The court supported its finding by pointing to testimony
given by defendant's agents which tended to show that the violations
in question were partially attributable to defendant's misplaced re-
liance upon a misleading pamphlet issued by the Federal Reserve
13oard. 77
 Moreover,- the court considered the fact that defendant had
consulted both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade
Commission prior to initiating its coupon plan and that both agencies
had at least tacitly approved the plan.'" Since the court determined
that 1640(c) contemplates a creditor's motive, state of mind, and in-
tention to violate the law, the court ruled that defendant's efforts to
a' 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
7(' Id. at 540, 543. Under this coupon system, the customer obtained a book of
coupons which he could later exchange for merchandise at any Grant store, The
coupons varied in denominations from 25 cents to $10 and the books ranged in value
from $20 to $200. The coupons could be exchanged for merchandise any time after
purchase. When a customer exchanged a coupon, his obligation accrued and a finance
charge was levied. Id. at 534.
71 1d. at 543.
72 Id. at 544.
73 1d.
74 1d.
75 1d.
7° Id. at 543,
77 Id. at 540-41. Defendant made certain terminology changes in its retail install-
ment sales contract based on suggestions contained in a pamphlet published by the
Federal Reserve Board. These changes were later found to be violative of Regulation Z.
Id.
" Id. at 541-43. Specifically, Grant Credit Contract Forms were submitted to the
Federal Trade Commission for its review on three separate occasions. The forms were
also reviewed by the Federal Reserve Board. Neither of these agencies ever advised de-
fendant that its credit contract violated the Act. Id.
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comply with the Act brought defendant within 1640(c)'s confines."
Arguments reflecting these conflicting constructions of intent
were presented to the Seventh Circuit in Haynes v. Logan. Furniture
Mart, Inc. 8° The district court in Haynes had found that defendant's
retail installment contract violated seven specific provisions of the
Act," but nevertheless upheld defendant's 1640(c) defense because it
concluded that defendant had relied upon the mistaken advice of
counsel." In reaching this conclusion, the district court reasoned that
intent, as employed in 1640(c), was directed to the violation of the law
itself rather than to the acts which constitute violations of the law."
The Seventh Circuit reversed, opting for the Ratner construction
of intent." In adopting Ratner and dismissing the Wehnaker rationale,
the court of appeals asserted that any construction of 1640(c) which
claims that its intent element refers to an intent to violate the law
necessarily equates the term with a knowing and willful violation."
However, the court noted that "knowing and willful" is the standard
for establishing criminal liability under the Act. 86 Thus, the court con-
cluded that intent, as used in 1640(c), can not mean an intent to vio-
late the Act but must necessarily refer to an intent to do an act which
results in a disclosure violation."
Besides employing a contextual analysis, the court also relied
upon 1640(c)'s express language and legislative history to support its
conclusion that 1640(c) encompasses only clerical errors."' With re-
gard to the former, the court asserted that the.Act's provision requir-
ing creditors to take due care to create procedures to avoid error is an
obvious reference to internal controls." Such a reference in a law
mandating the presentation of many exact figures and percentages
unique to each transaction plainly suggests that 1640(c) was intended
to encompass basically only clerical errors." In conjunction with this
assertion, the court stated 1640(c)'s legislative history shows that the
section was included in the Act only after creditors complained that
clerical and mathematical errors would inevitably result as a conse-
"Id, at 543.
8" 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 1162 n.l. The trial court found that the defendant failed to make
specific disclosures required by subparagraphs (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(5), (c)(7),
and (c)(8)(ii) of 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1976). The court further found that the computation
of any unearned finance charge in the event of prepayment was not identified, a viola-
tion of 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1976). In addition, no disclosure was made that insur-
ance coverage was not required, a violation of 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5) (1976).
82 Id. at 1162.
99 Id. at 1166.
94 /d. at 1166-67.
88 Id. at 1166.
98 Id.
"Id. at 1166-67.
3' Id, at 1167.
8"Id.
9"Id.
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quence of the complexity of annual rate computations."'
Since the goal of the Act is to promote the informed use of con-
sumer credit, the Seventh Circuit in Haynes properly adopted Ratner's
construction of intent. If the court had adopted the Web:raker con-
struction, creditors could only be found civilly liable if the consumer
sufficiently proved that the creditor intended to violate the Act. A
construction of 1640(c) which places such an inordinate burden on
the consumer renders the Act's civil remedy hollow."' Establishing a
knowing and willful standard for civil liability would also frustrate the
Act's goal of full disclosure because under such a construction cred-
itors could take minimum efforts to provide the consumer with the
required disclosures and still elude civil liability.
In light of the Act's express language and legislative history, the
Haynes court's comparison of the civil and criminal sanctions of the
Act. lends weight. to its conclusion that 1640(c)'s intent requirement re-
fers to an intent to do an act and not to an intent to break the law. If
a consumer bringing a civil action under the Act were required to
prove that the creditor intended to violate the Act in order to prevail,
the Act's criminal section would be little more than a redundancy.
Further, since the original House bill required a knowing violation to
sustain a finding of civil liability, 93
 and since this requirement was de-
leted from the bill's final version in response to complaints registered
by the Justice Department that a knowing requirement would weaken
civil enforcement,'" it is apparent that intent as used in 1640(c) was
not meant to signify an intent to violate the Act. Moreover, the Haynes
holding is consistent with the Act's enforcement scheme because it
diminishes the vigor of 1640(c) and thereby promotes private en-
forcement.
Closely following the reasoning of Rattier, the Seventh Circuit in
Haynes concluded that 1640(c) offers no shelter from liability for a de-
fendant whose error was not clerical in nature." Although both
Ratner and Haynes claimed that 1640(c)'s express language and its
legislative history clearly show that the defense went to clerical errors
alone, neither opinion gave much indication as to the type of errors
envisioned by the phrase. Since Ratner and Haynes ruled that clerical
errors are the only errors that are unintentional for purposes of
1640(c), this comment next will consider the definition of "clerical
error" by examining two essential components: the identity of the
person who committed the error, and the specific nature of the error
which produced the violation.
"Id.
" Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
"CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT: HEARINGS ON H.R. 11601 BEFORE. THE
SURCOMM, ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, H.R.
Doc. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 24 (1967).
" 4 Id. at 902-03.
"5 503 F.2d at 1167.
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A. The Identity of the "Clerk" Committing the Error
A clerical error, literally, is one that is made by a clerk. As a
matter of/ practice, since the Act encompasses both straight loans and
credit safes, it is usually a junior loan officer or salesperson who is
charged with the responsibility of making the required disclosures."
Although most creditors employ preprinted form agreements, it is the
responsibility of the loan officer or salesperson to complete the form
by inserting, inter alia, the amount of the finance charge, the number
of monthly payments, and the annual percentage rate. Although the
finance charge and the number of monthly payments are matters of
simple arithmetic, conversion tables must normally be used in deter-
mining the annual percentage rate." After this computation is made
and the amounts transposed to the credit form, the consumer usually
signs the agreement and each party retains a copy.
As was noted above, at the Senate subcommittee hearings on the
Act, creditors expressed doubts that their employees could be trained
either to use the rate conversion tables proficiently or to compute the
annual percentage rate independently." For example, one witness tes-
tified that in Massachusetts, a state in which a truth-in-lending act had
been in effect prior to the Act's passage," officers of several depart-
ment stores had complained that the act was causing problems for
their clerical employees.'°° Another witness advocated the inclusion of
exemptions in the Act to excuse the mathematical errors of a loan
officer,'°' while yet another expressed the fear that an automobile
salesman could not be expected to compute accurately the annual
percentage rate applicable to an irregular payment contract. 102 It
would seem, then, that the Act's legislative history suggests that many
of the complaints which led Congress to include 1640(c) in the Act
were directed at errors made by the lower level employees of a credit
enterprise.
While not expressly referring to 1540(c)'s legislative history, the
Southern District of New York in Sambolin v. Klein Sales Co.'" consid-
ered whether a creditor's failure to fill in a blank space on its retail
D6 See :TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: HEARINGS ON S.5 BEFORE THE SURCOMM. ON
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. DOC. No.
392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 381 (1967) (statement of Ralph Zaun).
DT See CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT: HEARINGS ON H .R. 11061 BEFORE
SUISCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, H.R.
Doc. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 77 (1967).
DD TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: HEARINGS ON 5.5 BEFORE THE SURCOMM, ON FINANCIAL.
INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. Doc. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1967) (statement of Paul Menton).
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 140C (1969).
'°U TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: HEARINGS ON S.5 BEFORE Tf IE SUBCOM NI. ON FINANCIAL
1NsTrruTioNs OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. Doc. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1967) (statement of Paul Menton).
'°' Id. at 374-81 (statement of Ralph Zaun).
iO 4 Id. at 698 (statement of National Automobile Dealers Association).
103 5 CONS. CRED, GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,432 at 87,858 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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installment contract, which would have apprised the consumer of the
number of payments required under the agreement, was an excusable
violation under 1640(c)." 4 As a matter of law, the court ruled that
1640(c) was inapplicable since the form containing the disclosures and
the omission was used not by a low-level employee, but by a sole
proprietor.'° 3 As such, the court refused to characterize the error in
question as clerical."' Thus, the court was cognizant of the identity of
the person committing the error and this awareness played some part
in its decision to disallow a 1640(c) defense."' Similarly, in Gerasta v.
Hibernia National Bank, 1 " s consumers brought a civil action alleging
that the defendant-bank failed to notify them of their right to rescind
the credit agreement as required by Regulation Z."' Specifically, the
complaint charged that the bank's manager who drafted the disclos-
ure statement inserted the wrong rescission date on the statement."'
In deciding whether 1640(c) applied, the court took cognizance of the
fact that it was the bank's manager who was responsible for commit-
ting the error."' As such, the court held that the error could not be
considered clerical." 2
These two cases, along with the legislative history of 1640(c),
demonstrate that the identity of the person committing the error is an
important factor in deciding whether to allow a 1640(c) defense. Con-
sideration of this factor is warranted because, limiting 1640(c) to er-
rors committed by low-level employees comports with the remedial
nature of the Act. Specifically, the proposed identity limitation fosters
private enforcement by further constricting the applicability of the
1640(c) defense. Yet, the inquiry into whether a particular disclosure
violation was caused by a clerical error is not terminated simply by de-
termining the identity of the person responsible. Rather, the exact na-
ture of the error must be explored before the "clerical error" label
can be attached.
B. The Nature rf Clerical Error
An examination of the Senate subcommittee hearings on the Act
reveals that most of the arguments against the Act's passage focused
upon the problem of requiring disclosure of the annual percentage
rate."' Creditors generally feared that disclosing an annual percen-
" Id.
"Id.
1 " Id.
"" Id.
LOH 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1976).
"" Id. at 181.
"Da at 189-90.
"' Id.
"2 /d, at 189-90 n.41.
13 TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: H EARINGS  ON S.5 BEFORE TILE SURCOMM. ON FINANCIAL.
INsTiTuTioNs OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. Doc. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 374, 698 (1967).
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tage rate, either by calculating it independently or by transposing it
from a table, would inevitably produce computational errors which
would lead to civil liability. 14
 Thus, 1640(c) has been said to exist
principally in response to creditor apprehension over computational
errors in disclosing the annual percentage rate. ° 5 A close reading of
those cases which have held that 1640(c) excuses only clerical errors
provides further insight into the type of error to which the phrase re-
fers. Several courts have suggested that a clerical error is computa-
tional, arithmetical, typographical, or transpositional. 18 As an aggre-
gate, these cases indicate that a clerical error occurs when something
goes wrong in computing the annual percentage rate. The Act's legis-
lative history and these cases thus pose the issue of whether the
1640(c) defense is limited to errors committed in computing the an-
nual percentage rate.
The Fifth Circuit in Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 117 con-
sidered whether defendant's failure to fill in a blank on a disclosure
statement provided to inform the consumer of the cost of credit life
insurance was defensible under 1640(c). Although the court ruled that
defendant had no recourse to 1640(c) since it failed to produce any
evidence that it maintained procedures to avoid errors," 8 the court
intimated in dicta that defendant's failure to fill in the blank might be
the typical clerical error at which 1640(c) is aimed.'"
The dicta in Turner is supported neither by the Act's legislative
history nor by the broader purposes of the Act. Since a preponder-
ance of the testimony at the Senate subcommittee hearings which ad-
vocated exemptions from civil liability was levelled at the annual per-
centage rate,"8 an expansion of section 1640(c) to encompass errors
other than those committed in disclosing the annual percentage rate is
unwarranted. Moreover, Turner's suggested expansion of 1640(c) is
inappropriate because of the Act's broadly remedial purpose and its
policy favoring private enforcement. Section 1640(c) represents a lim-
ited concession to creditors who specifically complained about the
difficulty of disclosing accurately the annual percentage rate.'" Since
the goal of the Act is to require creditors to provide consumers with
sufficiently understandable information to make an informed deci-
114 Id .
"sRainer, 329 F. Supp. at 281 n.17.
" 6 See, e.g., Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12, 20 n.7 (F.D. Va.
1975); First Nat'l City Bank v. Drake, [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 198,939 at 88,653 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
117 537 F.2d 1296, 1297 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1297. See 15 U.S.C.	 1640(c) (Supp. V 1975), which requires the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid error. See discussion in text at
notes 123-47 infra.
""See Turner, 537 F.2d at 1297.
' 2° See TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: HEARINGS ON S.5 BEFORE THE SURCOMM. ON
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON B ANKING AND CURRENCY, S. Doc. No.
392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 226, 374, 426-27, 529, 584, 698 (1967).
121 Id.
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sion, the deprivation of necessary information frustrates the Act's
purposes. In light of the Act's overall philosophy and 1640(c)'s legisla-
tive history, a creditor should be allowed to escape liability for viola-
ting the Act only if its violation is attributable to an annual percentage rate
error.
Additionally, restricting 1640(c) to errors made in disclosing the
annual percentage rate makes sense in a commercial context. Errors
committed in computing the annual percentage rate occur spontane-
ously, often within the presence of the consumer. Since most consum-
ers want to complete their credit transactions as quickly as possible,
there is at least tacit pressure to disclose the annual percentage rate
swiftly. Due to the complexity of the conversion tables which most
creditors use to compute the rate and to the possibility that in some
irregular payment contracts either a special table must be used or the
rate must be computed independently, spontaneous calculation of the
annual percentage rate could result in an erroneous disclosure. Thus,
limiting 1640(c) to annual percentage rate errors has a sound basis in
commercial reality.
The identity of the person committing the error as well as the
specific nature of the error in question are two significant considera-
tions in determining whether an error is clerical. However, the in-
quiry into the merits of a 1640(c) defense does not terminate with
these considerations because the statute requires creditors to prove
that they maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
errors.' 22 Thus, analysis of 1640(c) may conveniently commence with
the nature of the error committed but it concludes with the determi-
nation of whether a particular creditor maintained procedures de-
signed to detect clerical errors.
III.  THE MAINTENANCE ELEMENT
Rather than exempting errors in disclosing annual percentage
rates from civil liability altogether, Congress chose to require creditors
to prove, as a matter of defense, that they have maintained proce-
dures reasonably adapted to avoid error. Consistent with the congres-
sional attempt to change the philosophy of the credit industry from
"let the buyer beware" to "let the seller disclose," 123 and in light of the
policy favoring private enforcement, the creditor's burden of proof is
heavy. However, Congress remained silent as to the type of proce-
dures that might satisfy 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement, and thus
left the matter open to judicial determination. This section will first
discuss the type of showing necessary to meet the statutory "mainte-
nance" requirement. Additionally, various rechecking systems will be
proposed as means for satisfying this requirement. Finally, since a
creditor's decision as to which type of rechecking system it should
"'See discussion in text at notes 123-47 infra.
13 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
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employ ultimately depends upon the system's cost, the cost factor will
be analyzed in light of 1640(c)'s overall structure. Although judicial
construction of section 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement places a
heavy burden of proof on the creditor, it will be concluded that the
burden of establishing a consistently maintained rechecking procedure
comports with the Act'S goal of preventing consumers from being ex-
posed to incomplete, misleading, or erroneous credit information.
The Seventh Circuit in Mirabal was the first court to undertake
an analysis of 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement.'" The undisputed
facts of the case reveal that the controversy arose out of a credit
purchase of a new automobile.' 25 The consumers financed their
purchase through GMAC and the terms of the transaction were con-
tained in a mutually executed retail installment sales agreement.' 26
The installment agreement disclosed an annual percentage rate of
11.08 percent, whereas the rate which was actually applicable to the
transaction was 12.83 percent.'" The consumers brought a civil action
under the Act based primarily on the fact that the installment agree-
ment disclosed an erroneous annual percentage rate.' 28 They ob-
tained a favorable judgment from the district court, from which the
creditors appealed. 12 " On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reexamined the
application of section 1640(c) to the facts, and affirmed the district
court. The court of appeals first noted that under 1640(c) a creditor
must prove both that the violation at issue was unintentional and that
it maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid errors.'" The
court summarily ruled that defendants' error was unintentional, and
thus proceeded to consider whether defendants met 1640(c)'s mainte-
nance requirement.'"
In treating this issue, the court initially referred to defendants'
brief which described the procedures initiated in order to comply with
the Act. These procedures included the fact that the automobile
dealer employed specially trained office personnel to assist its sales-
men in determining annual percentage rates, that GMAC provided
the automobile dealers with special rate charts and tables to assist
them in computing the annual percentage rates, and that GMAC dis-
1 " Mirabal, 537 F.2d at 876.79.
125
 Id, at 874.
"" Id. The Mirabals had no direct dealings with GMAC. The district court found,
however, that because the automobile dealer arranged for the extension of credit while
GMAC actually extended the credit, both defendant-GMAC and defendant-dealer were
creditors under the Act. Id. at 874 n.l.
127 1d. at 874.
126 Id.
Id. The district court found seven specific violations of the Act. For each vio-
lation of the Act the court assessed damages of $1000 against the defendants. The dis-
trict court also found that defendants had violated Illinois law and thus rendered a
judgment in excess of $8,000. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's find-
ing that defendants had violated the state laws and reduced the final judgment to
$2,000 plus costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 885.
la " Id. at 877.
' 3 ' Id.
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tributed a manual to its dealers which emphasized the need for the
accurate disclosure of annual percentage rates.'" The court then
noted that defendants' procedures were impressive and that such pro-
cedures were clearly designed to disclose accurately the applicable an-
nual percentage rates.' 33 However, the court asserted that a mere
showing that such procedures existed did not resolve the issue of
whether defendant met the statutory maintenance requirement of sec-
tion 1640(c).' 34
The court found that 1640(c) required more than the mere
maintenance of procedures which have been designed to provide
proper disclosure calculations. It concluded that an essential element
of the maintenance procedure which Congress had in mind when
creating 1640(c) was an extra preventive step, a safety catch, or a re-
checking mechanism. 135 Since the statute requires the implementation
of mechanisms designed to avoid and prevent errors which might
otherwise slip through procedures merely aimed at good faith com-
pliance, the court postulated that 1640(c) requires more than just a
showing that a well-trained and careful clerk made a mistake. Rather,
the court suggested that section 1640(c)'s maintenance provision re-
quired either the first well-trained clerk's figuring be checked by a
second well-trained clerk or that the clerk who made the calculations
on an adding machine subsequently checked the figures by looking up
the figures on a table.' 36 Further, the court determined that section
1640(c) required a showing that the rechecking or other preventive
device had been consistently maintained by the creditor.'"
Applying this standard to the facts of 	 the court found
that the defendants had made neither of these showings.'" While de-
fendants' procedures were probably designed to provide correct dis-
closures, they did not contain any type of preventive mechanism for
detecting disclosure errors. Further, the defendants did not suffi-
ciently prove that these procedures were consistently maintained. In
fact, the defendants apparently did not seem to know what proce-
dures were followed in generating the annual percentage rate for the
Mirabals' contract.'" Accordingly, the court held that defendants
were liable to the consumers because they had failed to establish their
right to an exemption under 1640(0. 11 "
132 a
133 Id. at 877-78 n.9. The defendants pointed out that on a proper conversion
table the correct percentage rate of 12.83 percent is just one column above the percent-
age rate disclosed of 11.08 percent. Thus, they suggested that in going across this table
to find the correct rate, the slip of only a single line could have resulted in the error.
Id.
"'Id. at 878.
1351d .
"6 Id. at 878-79.
1 " Id. at 879.
1311
130 1d.
wo 1d.
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Mirabal is significant because it gleaned a two-pronged test from
1640(c)'s maintenance requirement. According to Mirabal, a creditor
invoking a 1640(c) defense must prove not only that it had established
procedures which included a preventive mechanism, but also that
these procedures were consistently followed."' The significance of
this dual requirement is particularly illustrated by the fact that prior
to Mirabal, most of the courts which had tangentially referred to
1640(c)'s latter clause made no mention of maintenance. The Ratner
court, for example, declared that 1640(c)'s maintenance clause re-
quired a creditor to prove that due care was taken to set up proce-
dures to avoid clerical errors." 2 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Ives v.
W.T. Grant Co.' 43 suggested that the maintenance requirement would
be satisfied if a creditor proved that it established procedures reasona-
bly adapted to avoid error. Even the earlier Seventh Circuit decision
in Haynes interpreted maintenance as requiring a creditor to prove
that it used due care in creating procedures designed to avoid
errors.'"
Mirabal, however, represents a. more appropriate construction of
1640(c)'s maintenance clause. By placing an extremely high burden
upon a creditor invoking 1640(c), the Mirabal standard serves to effec-
tuate the general disclosure policy of the Act. The Mirabal standard
requires creditors to do everything reasonably possible to avoid dis-
closure errors, thereby diminishing the efficacy of 1640(c) as a cred-
itor defense.' 45 Further, Mirabal's holding serves as a notice to cred-
itors of what 1640(c)'s much ignored maintenance clause requires by
establishing that a well-maintained rechecking system would comply
with the section, 146 and by suggesting two rechecking procedures
which would satisfy the maintenance requirement."'
A. Rechecking Systems
Even though the Mirabal court made the spZcific suggestion that
a rechecking system would satisfy the maintenance element of 1640(c),
the opinion is silent as to what procedures, other than rechecking,
satisfy 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement. Since Mirabal did not pro-
vide a catelog of possible rechecking mechanisms, various rechecking
systems will be suggested as means of satisfying 1640(c)'s maintenance
requirement. Moreover, it will be concluded that the decision as to
which rechecking system to institute depends upon the size of the en-
terprise and whether it is primarily engaged in the extension of con-
sumer credit. Although Mirabal suggests that other preventive proce-
"' Id.
"2 Ratner, 329 F. Supp. at 281.
"3 522 F.2d 749, 757 (2d Cir. 1975).
'" 503 F.2d at 1167.
'" 537 F.2d at 879.
"6 Id. at 879 n.14.
141 Id. at 878-79.
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dures might satisfy the requirement, it also asserts that in some in-
stances rechecking is the only way to avoid clerical error.' 48 The de-
fendants in Mirabal admitted that the erroneous rate disclosure would
not have been obvious when it occurred, and the court agreed that
this would be the case whenever the annual percentage rates differ by
only small amounts. 14 " However, since even the most highly trained
person makes mistakes, the court asserted that rechecking is the only
way to detect minor discrepancies in the annual percentage rate.' 5°
Since "clerical error" refers to an error in disclosing the annual per-
centage rate and Mirabal suggests that minor rate variations can only
be detected by rechecking, it would seem that creditors should im-
plement and maintain rechecking systems if they want to insure re-
course to 1640(c). Since a rechecking system could take a variety of
forms, creditors should institute a system that is reasonable in light of
both the total amount of the credit they extend and in terms of the
number of credit transactions into which they enter.
As a matter of theory, there are an infinite variety of rechecking
systems which would satisfy 1640(c). However, the size of the credit
enterprise is an excellent index as to the merits of any particular sys-
tem. Since it has been suggested that 1640(c) is limited to excusing
only errors made in disclosing an annual percentage rate, particular
attention will be paid to that disclosure. However, a rechecking system
which is designed to detect not only rate errors but also general dis-
closure violations could shield creditors from civil liability under the
Truth in Lending Act.
For those creditors who extend a significant amount of credit
annually, such as banks and loan companies, compliance with
1640(c)'s maintenance requirement could include creating a special
department to review retail sales agreements or loan disclosure state-
ments to determine whether they comport with the requirements of
the Act. 18 ' Although particular attention could be focused upon dis-
closure of the annual percentage rate, the entire disclosure statement
could be examined by these departments. If a creditor is engaged in
retail sales, each retail installment agreement would be submitted to
the creditor's special rechecking department before the agreement is
given to the consumer for signature. Under such a system, the person
making the sale would prepare the retail installment sales agreement
and compute the annual percentage rate. After preparing the agree-
ment, the salesperson would then submit it to the special rechecking
department whose personnel would examine the document, recalcu-
148 Id. at 879 n.14.
m.
"° Id.
181 See, e.g., Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l. Bank, 411 F.Supp. 176, 183 n.15 (E.D.La.
1976). The defendant-bank had assigned a special section with the responsibility of
examining truth-in-lending documents for errors in computation. Id. at 183. Its man-
ager testified that occasionally errors were discovered before the disclosure documents
were given to the consumer. Id. at 183 n.15.
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late the annual percentage rate by rechecking the conversion tables,
and determine whether the statement or agreement contained any
disclosure violations. The department would approve the document
and advise the salesperson that it was ready for signature.
Particularly large creditors may want to consider other alter-
natives. It is certain that a computer could be appropriately pro-
grammed to detect disclosure errors. Under such a system, after a
salesperson or loan officer completed the credit agreement, the form
could then be fed into the computer. The computer could ascertain
whether the document contained all the required disclosures and
could independently compute the annual percentage rate. If the
agreement contained an error, the error could •
 be brought to the
employee's attention. The employee could _then correct the error and
resubmit the corrected agreement to the computer for a final check.
Thus, the rechecking process would consume only minutes.
On a smaller level, however, creditors who do not extend a large
amount of credit could either train a few of their present employees
to review credit documents or they could hire a few specially trained
personnel to review credit transactions.. With regard to the former, a
bookkeeper or other salesperson could routinely examine credit
documents to determine whether they comply with the Act. The prob-
lem with this rechecking system is that the procedures may seem so
casual that they may eventually fall into disuse. With regard to the lat-
ter, the system would function as a small-scale rechecking
department. 152
 Alternatively, a small creditor could train all its em-
ployees to use either the rate conversion tables or to compute the an-
nual percentage rate independently.' 53
Although all of these procedures may suffice as rechecking de-
vices for purposes of the first prong of the Mirabel standard, a cred-
itor must also prove under Mirabal that it consistently adhered to the
rechecking system. 15 " Therefore, in order to maintain a valid 1640(c)
defense, a creditor must demonstrate more than the fact that a re-
checking system exists. 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement obliges a
creditor to prove specifically that a rechecking mechanism was in sys-
tematic operation at the time a particular disclosure error occurred.
At least one court has interpreted this provision as requiring a cred-
itor, at a minimum, to introduce an affidavit of a bookkeeper or of-
fice manager which details the procedures that were followed at the
time of the transaction in question.' 55
 Because of the maintenance re-
152
 See discussion of rechecking in text at notes 148-51 supra.
' 5 ' This proposed system may make more commercial sense for those enterprises
which are primarily involved in the finance business than it does for retail sales cred-
itors, because most of the employees of a loan company have received specialized train-
ing and have a degree of proficiency in the finance business. This, however, is not true
of the average salesperson.
151 Mirabal, 537 F.2d at 879. See discussion of maintenance in text at notes
148-51 supra.
1 " Pitkin Furniture Co. v. Jackson, (1969-73 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 11;99,231 at 89,190 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
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quirement and the problems of proof which it raises, these problems
could be alleviated if a creditor established and maintained one par-
ticular system of rechecking instead of rechecking rate computations
by a variety of different methods. If a creditor creates a specialde-
partment to examine credit documents, then all credit transactions
should be referred to this department.. Thus, when a dispute arises it
will be much easier for the creditor to prove the procedures it fol-
lowed in preparing the disclosure statement in question.
The wisdom of requiring creditors to maintain a rechecking sys-
tem is best judged against the objectives of the Act.'" Since it was
Congress' intention in passing the Act to require creditors to do ev-
erything reasonably possible to comply with the Act, requiring cred-
itors to institute rechecking systems is consistent with this remedial
spirit because a rechecking system will obviously detect disclosure vio-
lations. In other words, the rechecking requirement is an additional
means of ensuring that the consumer receives the disclosures to which
he is statutorily entitled. Although an argument may be made that a
requirement which forces creditors to establish and maintain elaborate
rechecking mechanisms ultimately may increase the cost, and hence
the price, of credit, such an argument should not. deter the courts
from requiring creditors to establish and maintain consistently proce-
dures designed to detect disclosure errors. First., since interest charges
and finance charges are often fixed by statute, any increase in the
price of credit will be subject to control.' 57 Second, the consumer
orientation of the Act as reflected in its broadly remedial spirit sup-
ports the proposition that a rechecking requirement is consistent with
the Act's philosophy.
B. The Cost Factor
By its terms, 1640(c) requires creditors to maintain procedures
which are reasonably adapted to avoid error. In determining whether a
particular rechecking system complies with 1640(c), cases suggest that
the cost of the system should be considered as an element of the term
reasonable. Thus, what may be a reasonable rechecking system for a
156 The prudence of ildiroba6 proposed rechecking requirement was questioned
by Judge Moore in his dissent in Mirabal. 537 F.2d at 886 (Moore, J., dissenting). The
dissent claimed that the majority opinion in Mirabal was predicated upon the belief that
defendants should have maintained a more error-proof bookkeeping department. Id.
This assertion implicitly questions the propriety of the judiciary becoming involved in
substantive lawmaking. The court in Mirabal did indeed closely scrutinize defendants'
disclosure procedures to determine whether they were adequately maintained. It is
submitted, however, that this inspection was warranted because the Act left the defini-
tion of 1640(c)'s maintenance requirement for judicial construction. Thus, according to
Mirabal, it is in fact proper for federal courts to fill in the interstices of the Truth in
Lending Act. Moreover, Mirabal's construction of 1640(cfs maintenance provision as re-
quiring the institution and rigorous adherence to rechecking systems comports with the
broadly remedial spirit of the Act.
1" See discussion in text at notes 13-19 supra concerning state usury laws.
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large bank is not necessarily reasonable for a small retail outlet.
In suggesting rechecking as a means of satisfying 1640(c), the
Mirabal court noted that requiring creditors to implement a recheck-
ing system does not place a great burden upon creditors.'" The court
claimed that checking a chart takes only a minute and making compu-
tations on an adding machine is also a quick process.'" Compared
with the broad disclosure goal of the Act, this increased labor cost is
slight. However, the Fifth Circuit in Turner v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. recently considered whether a creditor sufficiently proved that it
had maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid errors.' 6 °
After considering defendant's so-called clerical error defense, the
court held the defendant did not meet 1640(c)'s maintenance re-
quirement•and disallowed the defense."' In reaching its holding, the
court suggested that the error in question could have been detected
by the implementation of an inexpensive screening device.'" Since
Turner spoke in terms of the cost of a rechecking system, it can be in-
ferred that the court considered cost as a component of
"reasonable."'" Turner, then, not only reinforced Mirabal's suggestion
that rechecking satisfies 1640(c), but it also acknowledged that the cost
factor was an appropriate component of 1640(c)'s maintenance cal-
culus.
Therefore, in determining the feasibility of instituting any of the
rechecking mechanisms suggested above, a cost-benefit analysis is ap-
propriate. A creditor must weigh the overall cost of the system, in-
cluding the initial outlay of capital, against the benefits derived from
the fact that maintaining such a system would bring a creditor within
the parameters of 1640(c). It must further be noted that in any one
credit transaction, the maximum civil penalty for which a creditor
could he liable is $1,000. 164 Thus, the likelihood that a creditor could
he found liable must be balanced against the cost of establishing and
maintaining a rechecking system. However, given the remedial nature
of the Act and its proconsumer posture, a creditor -may not excuse his
noncompliance with the maintenance requirement by claiming that
the cost of a rechecking system was prohibitive. In other words, in
order for a creditor to properly raise a 1640(c) defense, it must ex-
pend whatever resources are necessary to create and maintain a re-
checking system reasonably adapted to avoid clerical-errors.
CONCLUSION
The Truth in Lending Act has been called a disclosure act.'" It
I" 537 F.2d at 879 n.14.
' 59 1d.
1 " 537 F.2d at 1298.
lei Id.
n's Id.
'ea Id.
te' 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
165 See Rainer, 329 F. Supp. at 276.
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requires creditors to convey credit information to the consumer in a
standardized format to facilitate the informed use of credit. Since the
Act created a civil enforcement mechanism and since civil enforce-
ment has been repeatedly encouraged, it is apparent that the defense
contained in 1640(c) was to assume a relatively minor role in the Act's
overall scheme.
The broadly remedial nature of the Act coupled with the Act's
legislative history have caused courts continually to diminish the
radius of 1640(c). This diminution has been accomplished by decisions
such as Ratner which have decided that the section 1640(c) defense
will apply only to clerical errors. Section 1640(c)'s circumference was
drawn even tighter in Mirabal, where the court construed 1640(c)'s
maintenance provision as requiring the institution of and adherence
to a rechecking system which is reasonably adapted to avoid clerical
error. This comment has also suggested that 1640(c)'s applicability be
further restricted: Since the phrase "clerical error" exclusively refers
to an error committed in disclosing the annual percentage rate, dis-
closure errors not associated with the annual rate should be excluded
from sanctuary of 1640(c).
Whether these narrow constructions of 1640(c) are warranted is
best judged in light of the Act's comprehensive objectives. Since
1640(c) emerged from the hearings on the Act as a narrow concession
to those creditors who complained about the difficulties associated
with disclosing the annual percentage rate, a narrow reading of
1640(c) is warranted. Such a reading is further supported by the Act's
consumer orientation as reflected in its remedial spirit. Thus, the per-
vasive philosophy of the Act supports any narrowing of 1640(c) and
justifies placing an extremely high burden upon those creditors who
seek to defend their disclosure violations by reference to the section.
HARRY L. MAN1ON, 3rd
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